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IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD? 
RACE AND CLASS DISCRIMINATION IN 
PRENATAL DRUG USE PROSECUTIONS 
CHRISTINE M. BULGER* 
PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEP-
TION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY By LYNDA BECK FENWICK. New 
York: Dutton. 1998. Pp. 390. 
Conflicts of opinion abound in regard to the moral and ethical 
questions posed by today's rapid advances in reproductive technology.l 
These issues include deciding whether or not to have fetuses tested for 
genetic abnormalities, considering freezing embryos for possible fu-
ture use, and determining the relative rights of both gamete donors 
and the offspring that their donations have produced.2 All of these 
issues generate thought-provoking discussions of ethics, morality, and 
personal choice.3 Among these reproductive dilemmas is the current 
trend of governmental attempts to criminalize drug use during preg-
nancy to protect the life of the fetus.4 This movement is resulting in 
the avoidance of prenatal care by pregnant drug users, the separation 
of mothers and children, and race discrimination.5 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I See generally LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY (1998). 
2 See generally ill. 
3 See generally ill. 
4 See generally Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (conviction under child abuse and 
endangerment statute upheld); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (conviction under 
child endangerment statute overturned); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. App. Ct. 1991) 
(conviction under delivery of cocaine statute overturned). 
5 See, e.g., Board of Trustees, American Medical Association, Legal Interventions During 
Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties fur PotentiaUy Harmful Behavior 
I1y Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990) [hereinafter AMAJ (stating that health and 
social welfare experts feel that criminal sanctions will prevent women from seeking prenatal care 
and that prison health experts warn that prisons are "shockingly deficient" in attending to the 
health care needs of pregnant women); Ira]. Chasnoff, et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug ur 
Alcolwl Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, FImida, 
322 NEW ENG.]. MED. 1202, 1206 (1990) (stating that the preconception that substance abuse, 
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Despite similar rates of substance abuse among Black and white 
women found in a 1990 Florida study, Black women's drug abuse was 
reported to health authorities at approximately ten times the rate for 
white women.6 This disproportion may be the result of the fact that 
public hospitals, where the patient population is largely made up of 
poor minority women, are "more likely than private hospitals to report 
women whose tests show drug use."7 Such a situation occurred in South 
Carolina, where the defendants for a Charleston prosecutorial cam-
paign against pregnant drug users8 were supplied by the Medical Uni-
versity of South Carolina (MUSC), a state hospi.tal serving an indigent, 
minority population.9 
Kimberly Hardy, a poor Black woman with only limited public 
health coverage, was the first pregnant drug user prosecuted for deliv-
ery of cocaine to her baby through the umbilical cord in Michigan in 
1989.10 Although the Michigan Court of Appeals eventually overturned 
her conviction in 1991,11 Hardy's description of her experience illus-
trates the racial discrimination involved in these prosecutions: 
It came as a shock ... and then I was pretty angry. Addiction 
is a medical problem. You wouldn't put a heart patient in jail 
for having a heart attack. And you wouldn't prosecute an 
epileptic for having a seizure .... It's been a nightmare! ... 
My baby was taken away from his mother for the first ten 
months of his life; there was no bonding with his mother. If 
this was to protect my baby, [taking him away] was more 
damaging .... And what about my other children? ... And one 
more thing, after all the publicity in my case, the prosecutor 
later prosecuted a thirty-six year old white woman lawyer to 
especially during pregnancy, is a problem that affects minority groups and lower socioeconomic 
groups could bias physicians in identifying substance exposure in newborns, thus resulting in 
higher rates of testing and reporting of infants born to Black or poor women); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH L. REv. 938, 939 (1997) (finding that prosecu-
tions for prenatal drug use reflect a growing hostility toward poor Black mothers in particular). 
6 See Chasnoff, supra note 5, at 1204. 
7 See Gina Kolata, Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A13. 
8 See discussion infra Part HA. 
9 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 941. 
10 See Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecu-
tion a/Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 737, 737, 741 (1991). 
II See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that use of cocaine 
by pregnant woman, which may result in postpartum transfer of cocaine through umbilical cord 
to her infant, is not the type of conduct that legislature intended to be prosecuted under delivery 
of cocaine statute). . 
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show he wasn't prejudiced; but the judge dismissed her case 
quick. 12 
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In her book Private Choices, Public Consequences: Reproductive Tech-
nology and the New Ethics of Conception, Pregnancy, and Family, Lynda 
Beck Fenwick examines the current legal, moral, and social issues 
generated by today's reproductive technology.13 Fenwick exposes the 
bitter conflict between individual choice and governmental regulation 
of reproductive options. 14 Alternating between real-life reproductive 
experiences and discussion of the various issues that these stories 
present, Fenwick explores such topics as surrogacy, infertility treat-
ments, genetic engineering and testing, use of fetal tissue in research, 
and governmental controls over women's reproductive choices. 15 
When Fenwick, a former trial attorney and adjunct law professor 
at Baylor University School of Law, began writing Private Choices, Public 
Consequences, she was in favor of passing laws "to protect the babies 
from the selfish decisions of too many adults. "16 However, by the end 
of her project, Fenwick had come to realize that parents could be 
just as vulnerable as the babies, and her feelings changed about the 
need for greater governmental regulation. 17 She now believes that the 
greater number of reproductive choices that need to be made today 
demand a higher level of individual moral accountability than in pre-
vious generations. IS In regards to criminal prosecutions of pregnant 
drug users, Fenwick argues that any governmental restraint or control 
must be exercised for treatment and fetal safety, not for punishment. 19 
Otherwise, many pregnant addicts may choose to avoid prenatal care. 20 
Part I of this Book Review will begin by describing Fenwick's 
discussion of criminal prosecution of pregnant drug users and its 
impact on Black women, how these prosecutions have been based on 
child abuse and drug delivery statutes, and the 1998 enactment of 
legislation that specifically targets pregnant drug users. Part II will 
examine some suggestions as to why minority women are being prose-
12 Greene, sUfrra note 10, at 737. Greene and his assistants interviewed Hardy on two occa-
sions, December 3,1990 and February 8,1991, for the purposes of the article. See id. at 737 n.1. 
13 See generally FENWICK, sUfrra note 1. 
14 See generally id. 
15 See generally id. 
16 See id. at 1. 
17 See id. at 4, 7. 
18 See FENWICK, sufrra note 1, at 7. 
19 See id. at 142. 
20 See id. 
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cuted in such disproportionate numbers. Part III exposes the fact that 
racial discrimination has not played a significant role in defending 
against these prosecutions and proposes strategies for bringing this 
issue to the forefront in these cases. While the stated intent of prenatal 
drug use prosecutions is to protect unborn children, the dispropor-
tionate prosecution of Black women suggests racial and class biases 
against poor, minority women.21 Such discrimination will continue un-
less a concerted effort is made to expose this problem and create 
empathy for these women. 
I. OVERVIEW OF PRENATAL DRUG USE AS A BASIS FOR CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS 
A. Fenwick's Study of Criminal Prosecutions for Prenatal Conduct 
Fenwick begins her discussion of criminal prosecutions of prenatal 
drug use by presenting the experience of Sara Collins, a thirty-six-year-
old white attorney who was addicted to cocaine during her pregnancy.22 
Collins believed that she was singled out for prosecution because she 
was "atypical": she was neither unemployed nor Black, as were most of 
the defendants in previous cases.23 Collins revealed her addiction to 
her doctor during the fourth month of her pregnancy, but since ad-
diction is not a crime, she could not have been prosecuted at that 
point.24 However, Collins did not stop using, and she was eventually 
charged with delivering a controlled substance to her newborn 
through the umbilical cord between the time of birth and the cutting 
of the cord.25 Charges against her were dismissed after the Michigan 
Court of Appeals decided People v. Hardy, which held that such a 
prosecution was not a reasonable construction of the delivery of drugs 
to minors statute.26 
21 See AMA, supra note 5, at 2665; Chasnoff, supra note 5, at 1206; Roberts, supra note 5, at 
938-39. 
22 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 114-15. "Sara Collins" is a pseudonym. See id. at 114 n.l. 
But, it seems clear that she is the "white woman lawyer" to whom Kimberly Hardy referred. See 
Greene, supra note 10, at 737. Professor Roberts indicates that the actual name of the white 
attorney is Lynn Bremer. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 958 n.l03. 
25 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 114. 
24 See id. at 115 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), which held that a 
California law making it a criminal offense for a drug addict to be within the state was unconsti-
tutional because it imposed criminal prosecution for a medical problem, drug addiction, without 
any accompanying criminal activity, such as possession or use of drugs). 
25 See id. 
26 See id. at 116-17; see also MICH. COMPo LAws § 333.7401 (2) (a) (iv) (1995) (Mich. Stat. Ann. 
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Next, Fenwick addresses the role of criminal prosecutions after 
conception.27 She states that the general public is increasingly asking 
whether a woman who decides to carry a fetus to term should be legally 
responsible for actions that she knows, or should know, will measurably 
damage the baby.28 
Fenwick notes that most prosecutors have relied upon various 
criminal laws, such as laws prohibiting child abuse or delivery of drugs 
to minors, unrelated to prenatal substance abuse in these cases.29 She 
also notes that most of the prosecutions have been for the use of illegal 
drugs, especially cocaine.30 Fenwick questions why the general public 
is not equally disturbed by other harmful prenatal behaviors, such as 
smoking, drinking alcohol and coffee, maintaining a poor diet, failing 
to seek early prenatal care, and working in unsafe environments.31 She 
then acknowledges the government's resistance to regulating legai 
behaviors, especially since it is difficult to assess the extent of damage 
to a fetus caused by abusive prenatal conduct and virtually impossible 
to trace the cause and effect of each behavior.32 
Fenwick cites South Carolina's aggressive prosecution of pregnant 
drug users as an example of the argument that addicted women are 
incapable of regulating their own behavior and that judicial or state 
intervention is necessary to protect the fetus.33 Charles Condon, a 
solicitor34 involved in these prosecutions in Charleston, South Caro-
lina, stated his belief that the medical caregivers and social workers in 
that city were so ineffective in reaching pregnant drug abusers that the 
only way to resolve this problem was to make individuals accountable 
for their own actions. 35 
Fenwick disagrees with this sentiment. Rather, she feels that any 
governmental restraint or control must be done for purposes of treat-
§ 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv) (Callaghan 1995»; People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites through umbilical cord to 
infant is not type of conduct legislature intended to be prosecuted under statute proscribing 
delivery of cocaine) . 
27 See FENWICK, supra note 1, at 129. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 130. 
30 See id. at 131. 
31 See id. at 131-32. 
32 See FENWICK, supra note 1, at 133-34. 
33 See id. at 135. 
34 A solicitor is the chieflaw officer of the city. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1393 (6th ed. 1990). 
35 See Henry Eichel, S.c. Lawsuit Spotlights Debate on How to Treat Pregnant Cocaine Users, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERvER,Jan. 31,1994, at lA. 
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ment and fetal safety, not for punishment.36 While education is the best 
strategy for reducing harmful conduct during pregnancy, society must 
be more willing to help these women in order for education to have 
any chance of success.S7 To underscore her position, Fenwick points 
out that current attempts to mandate healthy behavior during preg-
nancy too often include women who did not choose to become preg-
nant in the first place, in part or wholly due to their own addictions. 38 
These women are often unable to conform to the behaviors demanded 
from them and likely will not be capable of mothering adequately after 
the babies are born.39 Fenwick also points out that almost all medical 
associations and public health organizations, such as the American 
Medical Association and the March of Dimes, condemn these criminal 
prosecutions.40 
With respect to the prevalence of racial and class bias in prenatal 
conduct prosecutions, Fenwick finds that these charges are "not with-
out merit. "41 She then cites statistics from various studies42 and expert 
opinions43 supporting the existence of racial and class bias and dis-
crimination.44 But Fenwick does not delve very deeply into this topic, 
likely because it is too complicated for the scope of her book.45 The 
36 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 142. 
37 See id. at 139. 
38See id. at 141. 
59 See id. 
40 See id. at 142. 
41 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 135-36. 
42 See id. at 136. The Pinellas County, Fla. study is cited. See generally Chasnoff, supra note 5. 
The 1992-1993 National Pregnancy and Health Survey found that more than half of the women 
surveyed who were using drugs were white, although the percentage of abusers was higher among 
Blacks, and also that white women were far more likely to drink or smoke during their pregnan-
cies. See FENWICK, supra note I, at 136. A National Institutes of Health study examining responses 
from 42,862 households to a federal government survey taken in 1992 found that welfare 
recipients are no more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol than the general population. See id. at 
136 n.31. 
43 Research of the Georgia Addiction, Pregnancy and Parenting Project (GAPP) that began 
in 1980 supports the role intervention can play in helping pregnant drug and alcohol abusers 
and also warns against the dangers of coercive interventions that evidence a class bias. See id. at 
134. Dr. Claire Coles of GAPP observed that the use of legal and illegal substances exists at all 
levels of society, but social condemnation of individual pregnant abusers tends to be directed at 
poor minority women. See id. at 135. Iris Smith, also of GAPP, agrees: "Identification of substance 
abuse among more afiluent women is less likely because their doctors are reluctant to recognize 
it. If the woman is discovered as an abuser, and she is uncomfortable with the doctor's conversa-
tion, she'll go find another doctor. Low-income people generally don't have that kind of option. 
They have to go to the public health clinic; there's no place else they can go." Id. at 135. 
44 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 134-37. 
45 See id. 
1999] BOOK REVIEWS 715 
remainder of this book review will attempt to complete Fenwick's 
analysis of racial and class discrimination in these prosecutions. 
B. Prosecutorial and Legislative Attempts to Criminalize Prenatal Illegal 
Drug Use 
In order to criminalize prenatal substance abuse, prosecutors have 
attempted to use criminal laws prohibiting child abuse, neglect and en-
dangerment, delivery of drugs to minors, assault with a deadly weapon, 
and manslaughter. However, most convictions have been overturned 
on grounds of incorrect interpretations of the statutes at issue.46 In 
prosecutions based on child abuse and endangerment statutes, courts 
have overturned convictions for several reasons, including:47 1) a fetus 
is not a "child" within the meaning of the statute;48 2) application of 
the statute irl a fetal abuse context is inconsistent, which can lead to 
improper notice;49 and 3) legislatures never intended for child abuse 
statutes to protect a fetus. 5o When women have been convicted under 
delivery of controlled substance statutes through a theory of delivery 
through the umbilical cord after birth, appellate courts have uniformly 
overruled these cases. The courts have ruled both that the statutes do 
46 See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 217-18 (1977) (holding that statute 
relating to felony-child endangering did not refer to an unborn "child" or fetus and did not 
proscribe endangering of fetus by mother who used heroin during her pregnancy); Johnson v. 
State, 602 So.2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992) (holding that legislature never intended for general drug 
delivery statute to authorize prosecutions in which drugs passed from mother to child through 
umbilical cord after birth); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
that pregnant woman's use of cocaine, which might result in postpartum transfer of cocaine 
metabolites through umbilical cord to her infant, is not the type of conduct legislature intended 
to be prosecuted under delivery of cocaine statute); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710,710-11 (Ohio 
1992) (holding that parent may not be prosecuted for child endangerment for substance abuse 
occurring prior to birth because child did not become "child" within contemplation of statute 
until born). But see Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777,780 (S.C. 1997)(holding that viable fetus is 
"child" within meaning of child abuse and endangerment statute, and therefore mother could 
be charged under statute for taking cocaine during third trimester of pregnancy, causing baby 
to be born with cocaine in its system). 
4? See Michelle D. Mills, Fetal Abuse Prosecutions: The Triumph oj &action over Reason, 47 
DEPAUL L. REv. 989, 994-95 (1998). 
4S See State v. Gethers, 585 So.2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding it against 
state's public policy to consider fetus a child for purposes of aggravated child abuse statute). 
49 See Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) (holding that if criminal abuse 
'statute were to include injury to fetuses, it would be impermissibly vague and that statute would 
lack fair notice). 
50 See Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994) (holding that child endangerment 
statute does not apply to transmission of controlled substances through umbilical cord after 
delivery and that legislature's examination of this issue and its subsequent silence indicates that 
prenatal drug use should not be criminally prosecuted). 
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not provide sufficient notice that prenatal drug use would be consid-
ered a violation within the meaning of the statute and that legislatures 
did not intend for such behavior to be covered by these statutes.51 
To avoid these legislative intent problems, South Dakota and Wis-
consin enacted legislation in 1998 that specifically targets pregnant 
drug users.52 In addition, South Dakota law was also amended in 1998 
to include in its definition of an abused or neglected child one who 
was subjected prenatally to abusive use of alcohol or any illegal con-
trolled substance.53 The statute also authorizes emergency involuntary 
commitment of an intoxicated woman who is pregnant and abusing 
alcohol and drugs to an approved treatment facility.54 Wisconsin's law 
provides that an adult pregnant woman may be taken into state custody 
if there is substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn child 
will be seriously affected or endangered due to the woman's "habitual 
lack of self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled sub-
stances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree 
.... "55 While these laws do not provide for criminal sanctions, they do 
define an "unborn child" as a person with legal rights from the time 
of fertilization to the time of birth.56 
Similarly, in South Carolina it is unlawful for a parent to "place 
the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life, physi-
calor mental health, or safety."57 Conviction under this felony statute 
is punishable by a fine, a potential ten-year prison sentence, or both.58 
In Whitner v. State,59 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that 
the definition of a "child"-"a person under the age of eighteen"6o-
51 See Mills, supra note 47, at 995 (citing Johnson, 602 So.2d at 1290 (finding that legislative 
history does not show intent to use term "delivery" in context of criminally prosecuting mothers 
of delivery of controlled substance to minor by way of umbilical cord); Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 52 
(finding that "penal statute must be sufficiently definite and explicit to inform those who are 
subject to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties"». 
52 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-20A·63(Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. § 48.193 (1998). 
53 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-SA-2(9). 
MId. § 34-20A-63(3). 
5SWIS. STAT. § 48.193(I)(c)-(d). The woman may be held in the home of an adult relative 
or friend, a licensed community-based residential facility, a hospital, or an approved public 
treatment facility for emergency treatment. See WIS. STAT. § 48.207(lm). 
56 See Bob Herbert, Fetal Protection Conceals Real Agmda, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 16, 
1998, available in 1998 WL 6333375. This is evidence of a fetal protection movement with an 
underlying goal of having the fetus defined as a person in as many venues as possible, which can 
eventually undermine a woman's right to have an abortion. See id. 
57 S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50(A)(I) (West 1998). 
55 See id. § 20-7-50(B). 
59 492 S.E.2d 777, 777 (S.C. 1997). 
60 S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(1). 
; 
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includes a fetus in the context of the child endangerment statute.61 
This is contrary to the opinion of all other state appellate courts that 
have addressed this issue.62 By conferring legal rights to a viable fetus, 
the court found that Cornelia Whitner had violated the statute by using 
cocaine while pregnant.63 
Both Whitner and Malissa Ann Crawley, who was charged with the 
same offense as Whitner, pleaded guilty in 1992 in South Carolina. 64 
Each gave birth to a healthy child,65 but the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina's decision has removed both women from their families and 
put them into prison.66 At the time of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court decision, Crawley had overcome her drug habit, obtained em-
ployment, and was successfully raising three children.67 Lynn Paltrow 
of the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, which filed 
the appeal on behalf of the women, believes both were being targeted 
selectively as Mrican-American women to be the first to go to jail on a 
theory of fetal rights that hurts both children and women.68 
On May 26, 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari on Whitner's appeal,69 essentially allowing the prosecutions to 
continue and opening the door for other states to follow suit with 
similar statutes or interpretations of existing statutes.70 This may result 
in a slippery slope of prosecuting pregnant women for other legal 
61 See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997). 
62 See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214,217-18 (1977) (holding that statute 
relating to felony-child endangering did not refer to an unborn "child" or fetus and did not 
proscribe endangering of fetus by mother who used heroin during her pregnancy); People v. 
Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50,53 (Mich. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that pregnant woman's use of cocaine, 
which might result in postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites through umbilical cord to her 
infant, is not the type of conduct legislature intended to be prosecuted under delivery of cocaine 
statute). 
6!1 See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 782-83. 
64 See Politics & Policy Fetal Abuse: Supreme Court Lets South Carolina Law Stand, AMERICAN 
HEALTH LINE, (American Political Network, Inc.), May 27, 1998, available in WESTLAW, APN-HE 
Database [hereinafter, Supreme Court Lets Law Stand]. 
65 See AU Things Considered (National Public Radio radio broadcast, May 26, 1998) audio 
available in NPR Online (visited Mar. 2, 1999)<http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/archives/ 
1998/980526.atc.httnl> . 
66 See Supreme Court Lets Law Stand, supra note 64. 
67 See Bob Herbert, Editorial, Little Sense in "Lock 'Em Up" Attitude, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. 
Lauderdale, Fla.) , June 16, 1998, at 31A, available in 1998 WL 12817690. 
68 See All Things Considered, supra note 65. 
69 See Whitner v. South Carolina, 118 S.Ct. 1857, 1857 (1998). 
70 See Can Child-Abuse Laws Protect the Unborn? Case in S. C. Could Serve As a Mode~ OMAHA 
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behaviors that can harm a fetus, including smoking, drinking alcohol 
or even exercising too much.7! 
None of these statutes is racially discriminatory on its face. 72 Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court subjects race-neutral statutes to strict 
scrutiny if they are discriminatory in both impact and purpose.73 As 
this book review will demonstrate, these fetal abuse laws may very well 
be discriminatory in both their impact and their enforcement since 
they are directed primarily at pregnant users of cocaine, who are more 
likely to be poor minority women than middle-class white women.74 
However, no courts have overturned prenatal drug abuse convictions 
on the grounds of race discrimination, and attorneys challenging the 
convictions have not relied on the race of the defendants in their 
arguments.75 Therefore, special efforts are required to uncover the 
discriminatory impact of these prosecutions.76 
II. THE DISPROPORTIONATE PROSECUTION OF BLACK WOMEN FOR 
PRENATAL DRUG ABUSE 
A. The South Carolina "Interagency Policy on Cocaine Abuse in 
Pregnancy " 
The most egregious example of the discriminatory enforcement 
of these prosecutions occurred in Charleston, South Carolina from 
1989-1994.77 Forty-one of the forty-two prenatal drug users arrested 
WORLD-HERALD,June 11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5509149 [hereinafter Can Child-Abuse Laws 
Protect the Unborn ?J. 
71 See id. 
72 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50(A)(I) (West 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-20A-63 
(Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. § 48.193 (1998). 
73 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that discriminatory impact 
alone will not trigger strict scrutiny); Mills, supra note 47, at 1030 (citing LAuRENCE H. 'TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 16-20, at 1502 (2nd ed. 1988». 
74 See Mills, supra note 47, at 1030-31; see all'o Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373--74 
(1886) (holding that application and administration of facially neutral law in a clearly discrimi-
natory manner is a violation of equal protection). But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-98 
(1987) (finding that exceptionally clear proof is required before inferring that an abuse of 
discretion in the criminal justice process has occurred and also that proof that the state legislature 
enacted or maintained a statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect is required 
to find a violation of equal protection). 
75 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 940. 
76 See id. at 941. 
77 See id. at 941-44. 
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were Black.78 Even more disturbing, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
has upheld the convictions under child endangerment statutes.79 
An overview of South Carolina's "Interagency Policy on Cocaine 
Abuse in Pregnancy," illustrates the attitudes of the officials involved 
in these prosecutions and the reasons why mainly Black women were 
prosecuted.80 A collaboration between Charleston law enforcement 
officials and the MUSC, a state hospital serving an indigent, minority 
population, supplied the defendants in many of the prosecutions.8! 
In August 1989, Nurse Shirley Brown of MUSC approached the 
local solicitor, Charles Condon, about the increase in crack cocaine 
use that she perceived among her pregnant patients; she felt she had 
a legal responsibility to inform law enforcement authorities about the 
harm that was being inflicted upon unborn children.82 During the 
previous year, Nurse Brown and other MUSC staff members had iden-
tified and treated over 100 pregnant drug users.83 Condon viewed this 
situation as nothing less than harboring criminals, arguing that the 
hospital was obliged to report the cases if they involved viable fetuses. 84 
This prompted Condon to meet with members of MUSC staff, 
the police department, child protective services, and the Charleston 
County Substance Abuse Commission to develop a strategy to ad-
dress the problem.85 Broader law enforcement objectives quickly over-
whelmed the good intentions ofMUSC staff, and the threat of criminal 
charges was used to coerce pregnant patients into drug treatment 
programs.86 Condon also asserted that the physician-patient privilege 
did not prevent hospital staff members from reporting positive drug 
tests to police.s7 
Within two months, MUSC instituted the "Interagency Policy on 
Cocaine Abuse in Pregnancy," a series ofintemal memos that provided 
78 See id. at 943 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Partial Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 32-33, 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, No. 2:93-2624-2 (D.S.C. Oct. 1995) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memo-
randum]). 
79 See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777,786 (S.C. 1997). 
80 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 941-44. 
81 See id. at 941-42. 
82 See Barry Siegel, In the Name of the Children: Get Treatment or Go to jail, One South Carolina 
Hospital Tells Drug-Aflusing Pregnant Women, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, Magazine, at 14. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 941. 
86 See id. 
87 See Siegel, supra note 82. 
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for nonconsensual drug testing of pregnant patients, the reporting of 
results to police, and the use of arrest for drug and child abuse charges 
as punishment or intimidation.88 Although the program claimed "to 
ensure appropriate management of patients abusing illegal drugs dur-
ing pregnancy,"89 its origin suggests that the program was designed to 
supply Condon with defendants for his new prosecutorial crusade.90 
Hospital bioethicists later criticized the pressure that Condon exerted 
in instituting the policy so quickly because it precluded the painstaking 
deliberation that should have gone into a new patient care program.91 
Arrests had begun already by the time the hospital had officially 
approved the policy.92 During the first several months of the policy, 
women were arrested immediately if they tested positive for crack at 
the time they gave birth.93 
The policy also set up a so-called "amnesty program" whereby 
patients who tested positive for drugs were offered a chance to get 
treatment.94 Patients who tested positive were handed two letters-one 
notified them of their appointment with the substance abuse clinic; 
the other, from Condon, warned that 
[iJf you fail to complete substance abuse counselling [sic], 
fail to cooperate with the Department of Social Services in 
the placement of your child and services to protect that child, 
or if you fail to maintain clean urine specimens during your 
substance abuse rehabilitation, you will be arrested by the 
police and prosecuted by the Office of the Solicitor.95 
Women who failed to meet these requirements would not receive a 
second chance.96 If patients refused or failed to enter into a treat-
ment program, they would be arrested.97 
88 See Roberts, supra note 5,at 942 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 78, at 10-11). 
89MUSC, Policy 11-7 Management of Drug Abuse During Pregnancy (Oct. 1989), quoted in 
Philip H. Jos et aI., The Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: A Cautionary Tale, 23 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 120, 120 & n.l (1995). 
90 See Roberts, sufrra note 5, at 942. 
91 See id. (citingJos et aI., sufrra note 89, at 122). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See Roberts, sUfrra note 5, at 942-43 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, sUfrra note 78, at 
18-19 n.25). 
96 See id. at 943. 
97 See id. at 942. 
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Depending on the mother's stage of pregnancy, authorities would 
charge her with drug possession, child neglect, or distribution of drugs 
to a minor.9s If authorities felt that a woman was "uncooperative," law 
enforcement would arrest her upon one positive drug test. 99 These 
tactics led to the arrest of forty-two patients, all but one of whom were 
Black 100 
The arrests resembled the conduct of a state in some totalitarian 
regime, with police apprehending some patients within days, or even 
hours, of giving birth, hauling them to jail in handcuffs and leg shack-
les.101 Police attached handcuffs to three-inch wide leather belts that 
were wrapped around the women's stomachs. 102 Some women were still 
bleeding from the delivery; when one complained, she was told to sit 
on a towel at the jail. I03 Another reported that she was grabbed in a 
chokehold and forcefully escorted into treatment. 104 One woman who 
was pregnant at the time of her arrest sat in a jail cell waiting to give 
birth. 105 Another pregnant woman was transported weekly from the jail 
to the hospital in handcuffs and leg irons for prenatal care; she was 
still in handcuffs and leg irons when authorities took her to the hos-
pital in labor.106 She was kept handcuffed to her bed during the entire 
delivery. 107 
The decision to institute this policy in a state hospital serving a 
poor minority population could be reason enough to believe that race 
bias played a significant role in these prosecutions. !OS An even stronger 
suggestion of racist motivation is the fact that all but one of the women 
9B See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 943 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 78, at 32-33). 
In addition, Nurse Brown noted on the chart of the sole white woman arrested that her boyfriend 
was Black. See id. at 943 n.28. 
101 See id. at 943 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 78, at 26; Philip]. Hilts, Hospital 
Sought Out Prenatal Drug Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at A12). 
102 See id. 
103 See Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant Is a Crime, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Win-
ter/Spring 1990, at 41,41. 
104 See Siegel, supra note 82. 
105 See id. 
106 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 943 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 78, at 27). 
107 See id. (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 78, at 27). 
lOB See Roberts, supra note 5, at 946; Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy 
and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women fur Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. 
& Soc. CHANGE 277, 318 (1987-1988); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-
Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REv. 745, 753, 782 n.157 (1990); 
Kolata, supra note 7. 
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arrested was Black. 109 The degrading, inhumane manner in which the 
arrested women were treated also indicates racial animus. lIo The next 
section will demonstrate how the South Carolina policy exemplifies the 
racially disproportionate impact in other states' prosecutions ofprena-
tal drug use. 
B. The Unspoken Racial Discrimination oj Prenatal Drug Use 
Prosecutions and Its Effects on Black Women 
While the above account of the South Carolina Interagency Pol-
icy evidences racially disproportionate enforcement on the part of 
hospital employees, law enforcement, and prosecutors, state officials 
repeatedly deny any racial motivation in the prosecutions, and courts 
routinely accept their disclaimers.llI Professor Dorothy E. Roberts ll2 
believes that prosecutors and judges have overlooked this blatant racial 
impact because they "see poor Black women as suitable subjects for 
these reproductive penalties because society does not view these 
women as suitable mothers in the first place."ll3 She attributes this to 
a deeply embedded mythology about Black mothers in our culture.1l4 
Accordingly, the disproportionate prosecution of Black mothers seems 
fair and natural, not the result of any invidious motivation, which 
makes it more difficult to challenge the prosecutions on the basis of 
race. 1I5 Other commentators agree that there is an unconscious racial 
bias and argue that patterns of racist opinions and attitudes are shared 
and reinforced by groups, a phenomenon referred to as the "circle of 
ignorance. "116 
109 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 943. 
11 0 See id. at 943-44. 
III See id. at 945-46. 
112 Professor Roberts, of the Rutgers University School of Law, is a noted scholar in the study 
of race and reproductive freedom. Her law review articles on the subject include Punishing Drug 
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Colm; Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 
1419 (1991); The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209 (1995); Irrationality and Sacrifice in the Welfare 
Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REv. 2607 (1995); Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 
YALE LJ. 1563 (1996); and Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS LJ. 935 (1996). 
I1~DoROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING 
OF LIBERTY 152 (1997) [hereinafter KILLING THE BLACK BODY] . 
114 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 946. For centuries, a popular mythology has degraded Black 
women and portrayed them as less deserving of motherhood by stereotyping them as sexually 
promiscuous and as solely responsible for the problems of the Black family. See id. at 950. 
115 See id. at 946. 
116 See Greene, supra note 10, at 799; see also Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, The Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REv. 317, 322 (1987) (stating 
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The South Carolina example illustrates this unconscious racial 
bias. The state used methods to identity pregnant drug users that 
resulted in disproportionate reporting of poor Black women.lI7 Positive 
infant toxicology reports sent to child welfare authorities were the 
main source of prenatal drug use information. us Since this testing is 
used more often in hospitals serving poor minority communities, it 
follows that Black women will be disproportionately reported. 119 In 
private hospitals more likely to have an affiuent white patient popula-
tion, doctors are less likely to screen pregnant women in this way.120 
These doctors may fear losing current and potential patients; they also 
feel more socially similar to their patients and therefore are less likely 
to report them.121 
The actual manner in which hospitals administer drug testing also 
disproportionately affects poor Black mothers.122 Hospitals commonly 
decide to perform an infant toxicology screening when the mother has 
not received prenatal care, which is often the case for poor Black 
women. 123 Many hospitals do not even have standard criteria upon 
which a decision to test should be made, so that hospital staff rely solely 
on suspicion and are allowed to perform tests based on their stereo-
typed assumptions about the identity of drug addicts. 124 
Nurse Brown of the MUSC hospital serves as an extreme example 
of the healthcare worker who holds stereotypical views of minority 
women.125 She frequently expressed racial stereotypes about her Black 
patients to drug counselors and social workers, including her beliefs 
that most Black women should have their tubes tied and that birth 
that unconscious racial motivation influenced by our cultural experience contributes to racial 
discrimination). But see ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 113, at 185, where 
Harvard law professor Randall Kennedy and Charleston, SC police chief Reuben Greenberg, both 
Black, state that they believe that the prosecution of pregnant drug users protects Black citizens 
and benefits Black children. 
117 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 946; McNulty, supra note 108, at 318; Robin-Vergeer, supra 
note 108, at 782 n.157; Kolata, supra note 7. 
118 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 946. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. (citing Chasnoff. supra note 5, at 1205; Carol Angel, Addicted Babies: Legal System's 
Response Unclear, LA. DAILY J., Feb. 29. 1988. at I (noting that reports from doctors serving 
upper income patients are rare)). 
121 See Chasnoff. supra note 5. at 1205. 
122 See Roberts, supra note 5. at 947. 
123 See id.; Robin-Vergeer, supra note 108, at 798-99. 
124 See Chasnoff, supra note 5, at 1206; Linda C. Mayes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine 
Exposure, 267 JAMA 406, 406-07 (1992); Robin-Vergeer. supra note 108, at 754 & n.36. 
125 See Roberts. supra note 5. at 947. 
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control should be put in the drinking water in Black communities. 126 
It is hardly surprising that such nurses would report their Black pa-
tients to the police. 127 
An ideological bias against Black women also exists. 128 Some con-
tend that "[p]rosecutors and judges are predisposed to punish Black 
crack addicts because of a popular image promoted by the media 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. "129 By focusing on maternal crack 
use, which is more prevalent in inner-city neighborhoods and is stereo-
typically associated with Blacks,130 the media created the impression 
that the pregnant addict is typically a Black woman. 131 Professor 
Roberts argues that the image of the pregnant crack addict has been 
added to the iconography of the "bad Black mother," which already 
includes the "matriarch," the domineering female head of the family 
responsible for the disintegration of the Black family, and the "welfare 
queen" who breeds children at the expense of taxpayers in order to 
increase the amount of her welfare check. 132 Because the media erro-
neously suggested that the problem of maternal drug use was confined 
to the Black community, a public health crisis that affects people of all 
races and economic levels was transformed into an example of the 
Black mother's depravity that warranted harsh punishment. 133 
Recent medical studies also demonstrate that criminal prosecu-
tion may be unwarran ted because the harmful effects of prenatal crack 
exposure may be temporary and treatable. 134 Studies suggest that the 
harmful effects of crack use on babies may be minimized by ensuring 
proper health care and nutrition for drug-dependant mothers. 135 How-
126 See id. (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 78, at 33-34). 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 948. 
129Id. 
130 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 950; Elijah Gosier, Crack Deals Cross Baundaries of Race, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 30, 1989, at IB; Syl Jones, On Race, Local Media Deserves Euthanasia, 
STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.Paul), June 21, 1990, at 23A; Andrew H. Malcolm, Crack, Bane of 
Inner City, Is Now Gripping Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 1989, at 1. 
131 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 950 (citing Kathleen Schuckel, Aims of Home for Pregnant 
Addicts Include Reducing Infant Mortality, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 30, 1995, at C9 (associating 
drug use during pregnancy with high Black infant mortality rate». 
132 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 950-51. 
133 See id. at 952. 
134 See id. at 953; Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine/Polydrug Use in Pregnancy: Twa-Year Follaw-Up, 
89 PEDIATRICS 284 (1992); Robert Mathias, Developmental Effects of Prenatal Drug Exposure May 
Be Overcome by Postnatal Environment, NIDA NOTES (Nat!. Inst. On Drug Abuse, Rockville, Md.), 
Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 14). 
135 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 953-54 (citing Scott N. MacGregor et al., Cocaine Abuse 
During Pregnancy: Correlation Between Prenatal Care and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRICS & 
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ever, the criminal prosecution of crack-addicted mothers accomplishes 
the opposite: Pregnant drug users will avoid prenatal care for fear of 
being reported to governmental authorities, and, if convicted and 
incarcerated, the woman will be faced with the likelihood of inade-
quate healthcare inside the prison system.136 
This result supports the theory "that punitive policies are based 
on resentment toward Black mothers, rather than on a real concern 
for the health of their children. "137 Furthermore, this prosecutorial 
interest may possibly appeal to white "majoritarian sentiments to pun-
ish crack/cocaine mothers for burdening society with their special-
needs children [.] "138 Despite the fact that the laws, and the officials 
who enforce them, state no explicit racial bias, these policies have the 
effect of discriminating against poor Black mothers. 
III. THE ABSENCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENTS IN 
PRENATAL DRUG USE PROSECUTIONS 
A. Diverting Attention from Race to Create Sympathy 
While prenatal drug use convictions have been overturned on 
appeal, racial discrimination has never been a factor in the decisions.139 
Because Black pregnant drug users are subjected to so many structural 
and ideological barriers, it is difficult for their attorneys to portray 
them as sympathetic parties.140 Therefore one of the strategies used in 
defending these cases is to divert attention away from these women 
and the stereotypes that degrade them. 141 
Defense attorneys and scholars have suggested three alternative 
arguments on which to focus to de-emphasize the racial images of 
Black defendants that make these defendants so unpopular.142 First, 
defense attorneys argue that concern for the health of the babies 
exposed to prenatal drug use should be of the utmost importance.143 
GYNECOLOGY 882, 885 (1989) (finding that comprehensive prenatal care can improve the out-
come, but also finding that perinatal morbidity associated with cocaine abuse "cannot be elimi-
nated solely by improved prenatal care")). 
1S6 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 954; AMA, supra note 5, at 2667. 
1~7 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 954. 
1~8 See Greene, supra note 10, at 745. 
1S9 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 940. 
140 See id. at 954. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
14~ See id. at 954-55. 
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Proper medical treatment, not a jail sentence, should result when 
prenatal drug use is discovered. 144 Second, legal experts warn against 
the potential expansion of state interference in pregnant women's 
conduct. 145 Arguments based on these first two issues have been suc-
cessful because medical and social experts have warned that the threat 
of criminal punishment may cause pregnant drug users to avoid pre-
natal treatment altogether. 146 Also, legal authorities stress that such 
convictions could lead to prosecutions of all sorts of illegal and legal 
behaviors that may be unhealthy for a fetus, such as smoking, drinking 
alcohol, and not maintaining proper nutrition.147 
The third strategy used by defense attorneys is relying on the 
precedents of white women's successful appeals of prenatal drug use 
convictions.148 The rationale here is that calling attention to the harm 
to privileged white women is more likely to generate sympathy and 
change for poor minority women than emphasizing the harm to poor 
minority women themselves. 149 The desired result is a trickle-down 
effect of middle-class white women's reproductive liberty to less afflu-
ent minority women.150 
However, restraints on Black women's reproductive freedom have 
also trickled up to white women.151 An example is the Welfare "family 
caps" that not only gained popularity as a means of reducing the 
numbers of Black children on public assistance, but also denies ben-
efits to white children. 152 Accordingly, it may be more universally effec-
tive to start with the lives of the women at the bottom, indigent minor-
ity women, when arguing theories of reproductive freedom.153 
Fenwick's presentation of criminal prosecutions for prenatal con-
duct and arguments against them follows the pattern of emphasizing 
more sympathetic white defendants.154 She devotes an introductory 
chapter to the story of Sara Collins, the white attorney who was prose-
cuted for using cocaine during her pregnancy.15S Fenwick emphasizes 
144 See AMA, supra note 5, at 2667. 
145 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 954. 
146 See AMA, supra note 5, at 2667. 
147 See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 788 (S.C. 1997) (Moore,]., dissenting); Lynn Paltrow, 
lUvera Live (CNBC television broadcast,July 16, 1996)(transcript available in 1996 WL 7051755). 
148 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 954. 
149 See id. at 958. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 95S-59. 
154 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 114-43. 
155 See id. at 114-18. 
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the "enormous personal toll" the prosecution had on Collins: She lost 
her job with a firm during the prosecution of the case, and she has 
since been unable to find a new position with a firm.156 While Collins 
"avoided an attempt by the state bar to take away her license to practice 
law," she has only been able to continue as a solo practitioner.157 
Fenwick's technique illustrates how harm to a privileged white 
woman through such prosecutions is used to create sympathy for preg-
nant drug users.158 The one example of a Black pregnant drug user 
presented by Fenwick, Cecilia Lyles, is buried at the end of the chapter 
discussing these prosecutions. 159 Also, Lyles does not fit the "bad crack-
addict mother" stereotype. ISO In fact, Lyles was voted as the most likely 
to succeed in high school before she got caught up in the "nightlife"-
"drug arena" scene, during which time she got pregnant.161 It took 
several years for Lyles to admit her addiction; she explains her denial 
by the fact that she was able to keep a decent job throughout the period 
of her drug use. 162 Presently, Lyles has regained custody of her son and 
works as a counselor for addiction recovery and AIDS prevention 
programs.16S 
Intentionally or not, Fenwick chose to highlight an atypical Black 
substance abuser, not one of the more commonly targeted-for-prose-
cution poor, unemployed Black women, 164 to create sympathy. Lyles was 
successful in high school and she was able to keep her job during her 
addiction. l65 She was never criminally prosecuted; she has been able to 
overcome her addiction, and she works in her community to help 
other women who are now in the same position in which she used to 
be. I66 While Lyles is an excellent illustration of what can happen when 
a minority woman is given the chance to get proper treatment within 
an adequate period of time, she is not the target of prosecutorial 
campaigns set up in poor minority communities. I67 
156 See id. at II7. 
157 See id. 
158 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 114-43; Roberts, supra note 5, at 958. 
159 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 137-39. 
160 See id.; Roberts, supra note 5, at 950. 
161 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 137. 
162 See id. 
Hill See id. 
164 See Chasnoff, supra note 5, at 1204; Roberts, supra note 5, at 939. 
165 See FENWICK, supra note I, at 137. 
166 See id. 
167 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 938-39. 
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Decisions by defense attorneys to stay away from the issue of race 
is echoed in Private Choices, Public Consequences. 16S Fenwick focuses on 
her mainstream American audience and chooses women who will 
readily evoke sympathy in this audience for pregnant drug users.169 In 
such an atmosphere, recognition of race and class bias in these cases 
will not occur unless the focus is purposely shifted to expose this 
problem. 170 
B. Shifting the Focus to Race to Uncover Racial Bias 
Focusing on the lives of poor Black drug users is essential to 
revealing the embedded racial motivation in the prosecutions of these 
women. J7J By diverting attention from race in defending these cases, 
the opportunity to uncover numerous policies that infringe upon 
Black women's procreative freedom is 10st.172 Other examples of these 
policies include the distribution of Norplant contraception to poor 
womenl73 and measures that penalize welfare mothers for having addi-
tional children.174 When all of these procreative situations are con-
nected by the race of the women most affected, a clear and horrible 
pattern of discrimination emerges, continuing the legacy of the deg-
radation of Black motherhood. 175 
Another strategy for fighting these cases is to expose the inaccu-
racy of the "bad crack-addict mother" by providing the details of poor 
Black women's lives. 176 An example is Crystal Ferguson, who was ar-
rested for failing to comply with MUSC's Nurse Brown's order to 
enter a two-week residential drug-rehabilitation program.177 Because 
Ferguson had no one to care for her children for two weeks, and the 
residential program had no childcare, she requested an outpatient 
referral. I78 Furthermore, her food stamps and unemployment check 
168 See FENWICK, supra note 1, at 114-18. 
169 See id.; Roberts, supra note 5, at 957-59. 
170 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 960-64. 
171 See id. at 961. 
172 See id. 
175 See id. Several state legislatures have considered bills authorizing courts to impose Nor-
plant as punishment for drug related offenses as well as measures to offer cash bonuses to fertile 
women on public assistance who consent to implantation with Norplant. See Madeline Henley, 
Comment, The Creation and Perpetuation of the Mother IBady Myth: Judicial and Legislative Enlist-
ment of Norplant, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 703, 747-49 (1993). 
174 See Roberts, supra note 5, 961. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. at 962. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
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were stolen while she was in the hospital. 179 Ferguson was clearly faced 
with a no-win situation: She would be perceived as a bad mother not 
only if she did not go into the program, but also if she did enter 
treatment and left her children alone in an unsafe neighborhood. 
Another method for bringing race into these prosecutions is to 
emphasize the abuse of Black women's bodies.180 The Center for Re-
productive Law and Policy (the Center) filed a complaint with the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) alleging that the South Carolina 
Interagency policy constituted research on human subjects, which 
MUSC had been conducting without federally mandated review and 
approval. 181 The Center argued that the hospital had embarked on an 
experiment designed to test a hypothesis that the threat of prison time 
would stop pregnant women from taking drugs and improve fetal 
health.182 MUSe never took the required precautions to ensure that 
patients were adequately protected, and MUSC even handed over 
confidential patient information to the police without patient con-
sent. 183 NIH agreed that MUSC had violated the requirements for 
human experimentation, and the policy ended in October, 1994, as a 
condition of settlement with the Department of Health and Human 
Services, which had commenced its own investigation of possible civil 
rights violations. l84 
The Center's complaint allowed Black mothers to be claimants 
rather than defendants, enabling them to affirmatively demand an end 
to the hospital's inappropriate practices.185 This permitted Black 
women to hold the government accountable for taking part in a legacy 
of medical experimentation dating back to times of slavery, when 
doctors experimented on slave women before practicing new medical 
procedures on white women.186 Other illustrations of nonconsensual 
medical procedures forced on Black women include the coercion by 
doctors in the 1970s to get hundreds of thousands of Black women to 
agree to sterilization by conditioning medical services on consent to 
179 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 962. 
180 See id. at 962-63. 
181 See id.; Philip J. Hilts, Hospital Put on Probation ooer Tests on p()(ff Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
5, 1994, at B9. 
182 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 963. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 See GJ. BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LIFE: MALE ATTITUDES 
TOWARD WOMEN AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 101 (1976) (describing the 
brutal use of Black women slaves in gynecological experimentation). 
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the operation,187 the screening for sickle cell anemia of 13,000 Black 
women in Maryland in 1984 without their consent or subsequent 
adequate counseling, 188 and the willingness of doctors to override Black 
patients' autonomy by performing forced medical treatment to benefit 
the fetus. 189 A new focus on the history of race and class discrimination 
and the difficult choices that poor, minority women are confronted 
with on a daily basis will reveal the racial and class bias that underlies 
the criminal prosecution of pregnant drug users. 190 Perhaps this will in 
turn encourage courts and legislatures to more closely consider this 
issue. 
c. Constitutional Challenges Based on the Right to Reproductive Liberty 
Since it would likely be difficult to prevail on an equal protection 
claim,191 the constitutional violation can be reframed as an infringe-
ment upon reproductive liberty.192 Initially, it is important to recognize 
that these charges are premised on a woman's pregnancy and not on 
her illegal drug use alone, as the defendants are charged with offenses 
that only pregnant drug users can commit. 193 Therefore, it is the choice 
to carry a pregnancy to term that is penalized, because the woman 
could choose to have an abortion, which would probably result in the 
avoidance of criminal liability. 194 
A view of the constitutional issue as the right to choose to be a 
mother reveals the relevance of race to the resolution of these oppos-
ing conditions.195 Since race has historically determined the value so-
ciety places on a woman's right to choose motherhood, the devaluation 
of Black motherhood gives this right a unique significance.196 
187 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1442-43 (1991). 
188 See Mark R. Farfel & Neil A. Holtzman, Education, Consent, and Courueling in Sickle Cell 
Screening Programs: Report of a Survey, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 373, 373-74 (1984). 
189 SeeAMA, supra note 5, at 2665; Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE 
LJ. 492, 500-01, 520-22 (1993); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture 
in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REv. 487, 510 (1992). 
190 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 961-64. 
191 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that to prevail on equal 
protection claim, challenger must prove discriminatory purpose through evidence specific to his 
or her own case). 
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Prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers infringe on the right to 
choose to bear a child, a fundamental right protected by the Supreme 
Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird.197 Government intrusion as extreme as 
criminal prosecution infringes on this protected autonomy. 198 Not only 
do these prosecutions discourage the decision to bear a child, but they 
also impose a severe penalty for choosing to carry the child to term.l99 
These prosecutions also infringe on reproductive freedom by "im-
posing an invidious government standard for procreation."200 The pro-
secution of crack-addicted mothers infringes on the mother's right to 
make decisions that determine her individual identity.201 It also violates 
her right to equal respect as a human being by recognizing a lesser 
value of Black motherhood.202 Punishing a woman for exercising her 
right to bear a child "deprives her of a basic part of her humanity. "203 
When this denial is based on race, as demonstrated through evidence 
of the devaluation of Black motherhood, a racial hierarchy that essen-
tially disregards Black humanity is preserved.204 Therefore, by challeng-
ing these prosecutions as violations of the right of reproductive liberty, 
race discrimination will also be exposed.205 
CONCLUSION 
Prosecutions for prenatal drug use have usually been based on 
criminal laws prohibiting child endangerment and delivery of drugs 
to minors. State officials repeatedly deny that racial motivation plays a 
part in these prosecutions.206 Courts routinely accept their denials, 
since most convictions have been overturned on grounds of incorrect 
in terpretations of statu tes and never on race discrimination grounds.207 
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In addition, the attorneys challenging the convictions have not made 
arguments based on the race of the defendants, despite the fact that 
these policies clearly have the effect of disproportionately impacting 
poor Black mothers.208 
Race and class discrimination in these cases will continue to be 
ignored unless special efforts are made to expose this problem.209 By 
focusing on historical race and class discrimination and the present 
hardships and barriers that poor, minority women are challenged by, 
the racial and class bias that underlies the criminal prosecution of 
pregnant drug users can be uncovered, discussed, and hopefully reme-
died.210 Framing the constitutional issue at stake as a violation of repro-
ductive liberty also aids in confronting the problem of the devaluation 
of Black motherhood.211 The need for action in this situation is espe-
cially urgent following the United States Supreme Court's decision to 
deny certiorari on Cornelia Whitner's appeal. This denial essentially 
upholds South Carolina's criminal prosecution of pregnant drug users 
and allows other states to follow suit with the same devastating im-
pact.212 Allowing these prosecutions to continue will only further de-
grade Black motherhood and result in throwing more children into an 
already overburdened child welfare system. Is this in the best interest 
of the child? 
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